"Everyone Is Extremely Long 'Frothy' Stocks", World's Biggest Hedge Fund Warns; Sees Gold Soaring As Dollar Loses Reserve Status

From Zero Hedge 1/16/2020:

With the market meltup accelerating at an unprecedented pace, and hitting new all time highs day after day even as broad S&P valuations are now at nosebleed levels last seen during the dot com bubble...

... investing luminaries have emerged from the woodwork to issue increasingly dire warnings to anyone who buys stocks here.

And so, two days after Oaktree founder Howard Marks told Bloomberg TV that "now is not a good time to be investing", Greg Jensen, the co-CIO of Bridgewater, warned that he his fund was cautious on stocks, describing them as "frothy" as "most of the world is long equity markets in pretty extreme situations", and predicted that gold would soar to $2000 and higher because the Fed and other central banks would let inflation run hot for a while and "there will no longer be an attempt by any of the developed world’s major central banks to normalize interest rates. That’s a big deal."

In an interview with the FT, the man who oversees $160 billion at the world's biggest hedge fund, also anticipated even more "political turbulence" on multiple fronts as slowing US economic growth exacerbates the divide between rich and poor while tensions rise with China and Iran.

Bridgewater co-CIO, Greg Jensen.

It is against this backdrop that Jensen said gold could rise 30% from its current price of $1,550 and should be considered as "a cornerstone of investors’ portfolios."

"There is so much boiling conflict. People should be prepared for a much wider range of potentially more volatile set of circumstances than we are mostly accustomed to." Jensen told the FT.

Addressing an issue we have repeatedly said is the weakest link in the bubble-bust loop, namely the Fed's inability to correctly measure and thus target inflation, Jensen said even if inflation were to reach the central bank’s 2% target, "the Fed won’t be pre-emptive" which "takes off the table, in the short term, the normal reason cycles end . . . For most of the post-World War II recessions, the Fed dealing with inflation has ended the cycle."

In short, as Richard Breslow said earlier, the Fed now "owns" this bubble, and once the market crashes so will the last trace of Fed reputation. 

And not just the Fed: soaring recession fears in 2019 which sent a record $17 trillion in debt in negative yield territory prompted 49 central banks around the world to cut rates 71 times in 2019, according to JPMorgan. The Fed itself reduced interest rates three times last year, and launched QE4 in October ostensibly to "fix" the repo market but in reality to push stocks higher, just as the president had demanded.

It gets worse: while the "tinfoil" blogosphere has repeatedly said the Fed could cut rates back to zero, if not negative, Jensen is one of the first "serious people" who told the FT he would not rule out the possibility that the Fed could slash rates to zero this year as it looks to avoid recession and disinflationary pressures.

But the main reason why Bridgewater is going long gold is also the most startling one: as a result of coming inflation surge and the ballooning US budget and trade deficits, the status of the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency could be threatened.

"That could happen quickly or it could happen a decade from now. But it’s definitely in the range of possibilities. And when you look at the geopolitical strife, how many foreign entities really want to hold dollars? And what are they going to hold? Gold stands out."

What about other assets? After all, Bridgewater is mostly an equity fund? Well, if there was one word to summarize Jensen's position it would be that of Howard Marks: "sell."

Although rate cuts by the Fed have bolstered equity markets, Jensen said the group was “more cautious” on US stocks, describing them as "frothy." Echoing what we said in "Institutions, Retail And Algos Are Now All-In", Jensen warned that "most of the world is long equity markets in pretty extreme situations", particularly in the US, raising the appeal of emerging markets.

What happens next? Well, since humans are rather predictable creatures, he expects even more frothiness until it all comes crashing down: "a decade-long outperformance of the US is now being extrapolated and so people are generally under geographically diversified."

Is Bridgewater talking its book?  Probably - its flagship Pure Alpha strategy was flat in 2019, while its All Weather fund gained 16 per cent for the year. That said, it is unclear if the "book" that is being talked in this case is the long gold, or short equities one.

Here Is The Full Text Of The "Phase One" US-China Trade Deal

From Zero Hedge:

The full text of the 94-page US-China "Phase One" Trade deal is below, and here, courtesy of Bloomberg, are some of the top highlights:

Agriculture details:

• China Purchases to Include Oilseeds, Meat, Cereals, Cotton
• China to Buy Add'l $19.5B U.S. Agriculture Products in 2021
• China to Buy Add'l $12.5B U.S. Agriculture Products in 2020
• China to Approve Pending Applications for U.S. Bond Raters

As Bloomberg notes, China is committing to buying about $32 billion in additional U.S. farm products over the next two years, that's coming on top of levels seen in 2017 (pre-trade war). Specifically, China committed to importing at least $12.5 billion more agricultural goods this year than in 2017, rising to $19.5 billion next year. It's unclear just how this will happen without China's destroying existing supply chains. China will also “strive” to purchase an additional $5 billion a year in farm products.

Energy details:

• China to Buy Add'l $33.9B U.S. Energy Products in 2021
• China to Buy More U.S. Nuclear Power Equipment in Trade Deal
• China Energy Purchases to Include LNG, Oil, Products, Coal
• China to Buy Add'l $18.5B U.S. Energy Products in 2020

Chinese Purchases: This addresses some of the complaints American companies have about doing business in China.

• During the two-year period from January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2021, China shall ensure that purchases and imports into China from the U.S. of the manufactured goods, agricultural goods, energy products, and services identified in Annex 6.1 exceed the corresponding 2017 baseline amount by no less than $200 billion.

Intellectual Property: This is at the heart of the U.S.’s 301 case against China that started the trade war.

• The U.S. recognizes the importance of intellectual property protection. China recognizes the importance of establishing and implementing a comprehensive legal system of intellectual property protection and enforcement as it transforms from a major intellectual property consumer to a major intellectual property producer. China believes that enhancing intellectual property protection and enforcement is in the interest of building an innovative country, growing innovation-driven enterprises, and promoting high quality economic growth.

Tech Transfer:  This addresses some complaints American companies have about doing business in China.

• The Parties affirm the importance of ensuring that the transfer of technology occurs on voluntary, market-based terms and recognize that forced technology transfer is a significant concern. The Parties further recognize the importance of undertaking steps to address these issues, in light of the profound impact of technology and technological change on the world economy.

Currency, Competitive Devaluation And Enforcement Mechanism: The U.S. just removed China from its list of currency manipulators and this part of the deal gives them another way to enforce market-based principles of foreign-exchange rates.

The text contains agreements not to engage in competitive devaluation, to respect one another’s monetary policy and to maintain transparency. Much of that, though, could probably have been inferred from what the U.S. Treasury said the other day in the FX report that saw it remove the tag of currency manipulator from China.

The big questions revolve around the enforcement mechanism. The FX section says points of contention can be referred to a new dispute resolution arrangement that’s being established by the agreement, and if that doesn’t work, the IMF can be called in.

• 1. Issues related to exchange rate policy or transparency shall be referred by either the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury or the Governor of the People’s Bank of China to the Bilateral Evaluation and Dispute Resolution Arrangement established in Chapter 7 (Bilateral Evaluation and Dispute Resolution).
• 2. If there is failure to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution under the Bilateral Evaluation and Dispute Resolution Arrangement, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury or the Governor of the People’s Bank of China may also request that the IMF, consistent with its mandate: (a) undertake rigorous surveillance of the macroeconomic and exchange rate policies and data transparency and reporting policies of the requested Party; or (b) initiate formal consultations and provide input, as appropriate.”

The dispute arrangement itself is outlined in chapter 7, where some of the key sections appear to be as follows:

If the Parties do not reach consensus on a response, the Complaining Party may resort to taking action based on facts provided during the consultations, including by suspending an obligation under this Agreement or by adopting a remedial measure in a proportionate way that it considers appropriate with the purpose of preventing the escalation of the situation and maintaining the normal bilateral trade relationship.

• If the Party Complained Against considers that the action of the Complaining Party was taken in bad faith, the remedy is to withdraw from this Agreement by providing written notice of withdrawal to the Complaining Party.

Financial Services: Banks, insurers and credit rating companies have tried for years to gain more access to the Chinese market.

• China shall allow U.S. financial services suppliers to apply for asset management company licenses that would permit them to acquire non-performing loans directly from Chinese banks, beginning with provincial licenses. When additional national licenses are granted, China shall treat U.S. financial services suppliers on a non-discriminatory basis with Chinese suppliers, including with respect to the granting of such licenses.
• No later than April 1, 2020, China shall remove the foreign equity cap in the life, pension, and health insurance sectors and allow wholly U.S.-owned insurance companies to participate in these sectors. China affirms that there are no restrictions on the ability of U.S.-owned insurance companies established in China to wholly own insurance asset management companies in China.
• “No later than April 1, 2020, China shall eliminate foreign equity limits and allow wholly U.S.-owned services suppliers to participate in the securities, fund management, and futures sectors.
• China affirms that a wholly U.S.-owned credit rating services supplier has been allowed to rate domestic bonds sold to domestic and international investors, including for the interbank market. China commits that it shall continue to allow U.S. service suppliers, including wholly U.S.-owned credit rating services suppliers, to rate all types of domestic bonds sold to domestic and international investors. Within three months after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, China shall review and approve any pending license applications of U.S. service suppliers to provide credit rating services.
• Each Party shall allow a supplier of credit rating services of the other Party to acquire a majority ownership stake in the supplier’s existing joint venture.”

The deal remains vague on what happens next, simply stating that “the parties will agree upon the timing of further negotiations.”

Full deal text below (pdf link)

A European Perspective On Central Bank Digital Currency

Authored by Steven Guinness,

Throughout 2019 I posted numerous articles on the subject of central bank digital currency (CBDC’s) and how simultaneous reforms of payment systems throughout the world are being undertaken in preparation for the full digitisation of money.

I have demonstrated through the words of central bankers themselves how the goal of introducing digital currency is an integral part of their plans over the next decade. It is on record that global planners want to ‘reset‘ the current financial system and replace it with a new set up underpinned by intangible assets. Global elites refer to this as either the rise of the Fourth Industrial Revolution or a ‘new world order‘ of finance. What is a carefully preordained agenda has been fashioned to appear as nothing more than the innocent evolution of technology. It is a deception that can be challenged using the communications issued by central banks.

Rather than rely on supposition, let’s allow those within the central banking community to speak for themselves.

In November 2019 Johannes Beermann, a member of the German Bundesbank responsible for cash management, gave a speech in China called ‘Cash and digital currencies from a central bank’s perspective.’ Beermann confirmed that cash circulation in Germany is on the rise, with the Bundesbank having issued over half the total value of euro banknotes now in circulation. ‘There may be less cash around‘, said Beermann, ‘but we are far from being cashless.’

Beermann went on to say that new methods of payments ‘tend to evolve in stages‘, and that ‘the transition towards a society with less cash has to be driven by the user and not the supplier.’ But even though a large proportion of German citizens are still demanding banknotes, it has not prevented the Bundesbank from openly discussing the possibility of a central bank digital currency superseding cash in the future.

Publicly, the Bundesbank remain at the stage of viewing blockchain and distributed ledger technology as ‘promising‘, with ‘central banks open to them in principle.’ The ‘transformation‘ of the payment landscape, therefore, remains in flux and ‘anything but complete.’

As mentioned by Beermann, what has propelled the issue of central bank digital currency to the forefront of debate is the prospect of Libra, a new global payment system proposed by Facebook which would be built upon blockchain technology. It has prompted discussions on the need for a ‘pan-European digital payment solution‘. Prior to the announcement of Libra and subsequent criticism by central bank officials, digital currency was largely a niche concept within the mainstream. Only now has it begun to take a more prominent role, and given central banks the platform to shape the narrative on the future of money.

Near term, however, public issuance of central bank digital currency is not on the horizon. ‘We should go one step at a time‘, cautioned Beermann, who believes that cash will ‘continue to enjoy great popularity in the euro area.’

Following on from Beermann was Benoit Coeure, who later this month will step down as a member of the executive board of the European Central Bank to head up the Bank for International Settlement’s Innovation BIS 2025 initiative. In discussing ‘a European strategy‘ for ‘the retail payments of tomorrow‘, Coeure brought up the subject of CBDC’s and payment systems. As with Beermann, he stressed the need for a ‘pan-European market-led solution‘, one that transcends national boundaries and becomes the accepted standard throughout the entire European continent. But as we have come to expect from global planners, ambitions on this scale are advanced gradually. Which is probably why Coeure remarked that ‘global acceptance should be a long-term goal.’

The ECB, according to Coeure, will ‘continue to monitor how new technologies change payment behaviour in the euro area‘. This is predominately in response to a decline in the demand for physical money. The key takeaway from Coeure’s speech was in declaring that the implementation of central bank digital currency would ensure that ‘citizens remain able to use central bank money even if cash is eventually no longer used.’

This is why the notion of central banks being opposed to digital currency and seeing it as a threat to their supremacy is nonsense. With cash comes anonymity, and with that an inability to track and trace the economic behaviour of individuals. It was Mark Carney who back in 2018 declared data to be ‘the new oil‘. What central banks want is for every citizen to become entirely dependent on an all digitised system that the banking elites control. For instance, the growth of contactless payment technology is just one element which has greatly assisted them in this endeavour.

Another voice that is prominent on the subject of digital currency is Francois Villeroy de Galhau, governor of the Bank of France. Speaking in December last year (Central bank digital currency and innovative payments), de Galhau talked about the emergence of ‘new players‘ in the field of payments and how they have taken the initiative to transform the payment industry. De Galhau sees this as a challenge for banks, and potentially even a ‘threat to European sovereignty‘ if these players are based outside of Europe (most notably China).

As you might expect, de Galhau proposed a two fold response to this ‘threat‘. First, central banks should increase the speed on new payment solutions, and second they should consider the viability of introducing central bank digital currency.

In de Galhau’s own words:

We first have to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the digital revolution to develop a genuine pan European payment solution.

We as central banks must and want to take up this call for innovation at a time when private initiatives – especially payments between financial players – and technologies are accelerating, and public and political demand is increasing.

This stance is exactly in line with those of Johannes Beermann and Benoit Coeure, and reinforces the coordinated nature of central bank communications. The innovations of private developers are not so much a threat as more an opportunity to position central banks as the lynch pin of a future all digital system. It is why the likes of the Fed and the Bank of England are engaged in reforming their payment systems. The plan seems to be that the private sector spearheads the technological side, whilst the central banks act as the gatekeepers on aspects such as coverage and regulation. It is they who will ultimately determine who gains access to the next generation of payment systems and who does not, through a swathe of new regulatory requirements.

2020 is the year when the encroachment towards CBDC’s will kick up a notch. In France, de Galhau wants to begin experimenting with the technology over the next few months. It will amount to a test bed for the Euro system as a whole, and for de Galhau will ‘make looking into the possibility of an ‘e-euro’ one of its next focuses.’ The Bank of France will also take part in the BIS Innovation Hub, which will be led by Benoit Coeure. As shown in previous articles, the BIS are at the forefront of the central bank digital currency agenda.

But where will banks start with their experimentation? CBDC’s can be classified on two levels – wholesale and retail. Wholesale refers to payments made exclusively between financial sector firms, whereas the retail variant would be for general consumption at the public level. De Galhau believes that there would be ‘some advantage in moving rapidly to issue at least a wholesale CBDC.’ This would benefit central banks given that a limited release would enable them to iron out deficiencies before moving towards a full scale release that in the end would be at the expense of banknotes.

Finishing out 2019 was a speech by Mark Carney at a farewell dinner in honour of Benoit Coeure. Here, Carney explained the necessity behind central banks and private innovators working together to build a new financial system. The goal is to ‘provide the
best-in-class payment infrastructure that can enable private innovators to deliver the payment products and services our citizens need.’ Infrastructure that is of course controlled by the central banking system. From the Bank of England’s perspective, they plan to ‘allow new entrants access to the same resources as incumbents, while holding similar risks to similar standards.’

Central banks are making every attempt to convince those interested that innovations in the field of payments will result in broader competition and the growth of a decentralised network of operators. If the extent to which global industry is scrupulously monopolised by a handful of corporations is anything to go by, I highly doubt a CBDC future will be decentralised. An indication of this is in how developers and central bank officials have spoken of endorsing ‘permissioned‘ blockchain systems over ‘unpermissioned‘. The developers behind Libra want to use a permissioned network, meaning access is restricted to participants. On the opposite side today you have Bitcoin which uses unpermissioned blockchain. This is one of the reasons why central banks have cited Bitcoin as both an unstable asset and a risk to financial stability. But whilst they may speak out against Bitcoin, what they have not done is ostracise the technology behind it.

So far in 2020 we have heard from Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann and ECB governor Christine Lagarde on the prospect of digital currency. In light of Facebook’s Libra, Weidmann was asked in an interview whether the ECB should counter it with it’s own digital currency. ‘I don’t believe in always calling for the state right away,’ said Weidmann.

Whilst central banks continue to quietly advance their digital currency objectives, a narrative playing out within the financial media is that private innovations such as Libra represent a threat to the financial system due to a lack of regulatory oversight. This has created a sense of distrust with private led innovations. Important to recognise is how CBDC’s are a medium to long term goal. When banks are ready to launch digital currency, they will want it to be in an environment where people are increasingly looking to global institutions to provide stability in an increasingly unstable financial system.

As with fellow central bank officials, Weidmann pledged that central banks ‘will provide cash as long as citizens want it to.’ My concern is that as digital payment options become ever more convenient and cash usage falls, citizens will overlook the obvious dangers of entrusting their life assets to a digital only construct.

In a separate interview, Christine Lagarde was quizzed on whether creating a cryptocurrency was ‘a legitimate task for the ECB‘.

Innovation in the area of payments is racing ahead in response to the urgent demand for quicker and cheaper payments, especially cross-border ones. The Eurosystem in general and the ECB in particular want to play an active role in this field, rather than just acting as observers of a changing world.

I think we can safely take that as a yes.

When you combine all the comments raised there is one overarching message. Central banks are more than prepared for the digital revolution, primarily because they are the leading architects behind its inception.